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THE PRAGMATISM OF INTERPRETATION:
A REVIEW OF RICHARD A. POSNER,
THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY
Amul R. Thapar* & Benjamin Beaton**
The Federal Judiciary: Strengths and Weaknesses. By Richard
A. Posner. Cambridge and London: Harvard University Press. 2017.
Pp. xv, 430. $35.
Introduction
Just when you thought Richard Posner1 couldn’t write any faster, he
managed to squeeze two books into one. The final publication of his judicial
career, The Federal Judiciary: Strengths and Weaknesses, is a fitting valedictory for America’s most prolific judge. It features a robust procedural critique of the operations of the federal courts, alongside an impassioned
substantive call for his colleagues to adopt Posner’s brand of judicial pragmatism. Those two theses, however, are hopelessly at war with each other:
the case-by-case interpretive pragmatism Posner advocates would directly
undermine the systemwide pragmatism he claims to prioritize in the courts’
operations.
In assessing federal judges’ strengths and weaknesses, Posner finds much
to critique. His assessments are incendiary, profound, and trivial—often all
on the same page. Readers should arrive with an appetite: a single paragraph
on page 21, for example, covers the courts’ reliance on multifactor tests and
canons of construction, lack of candor, verbosity, jargon, pretense of objectivity, inadequate caseload, inadequate argument time, inadequate schedule,
and use of the dreaded Bluebook.
Many of these staccato objections echo portions of Posner’s past works.
This particular book’s most sustained and relevant criticism is that the
bench and bar are too rigid and reactionary: backward-looking “formalism,”
focused on dusty precedents and historical meaning, often masks judges’
* Circuit Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit (2017–present);
District Judge, United States District Court of the Eastern District of Kentucky (2008–2017).
Nothing in this piece reflects in any way on any pending or future case that may come before
the court.
** Sidley Austin LLP. The authors would like to thank Brian Fitzpatrick, Kurt Johnson,
Joe Masterman, Maria Monaghan, Sam Rudman, and Jonathan Urick for their helpful
comments and assistance.
1. Senior Lecturer, University of Chicago Law School. Posner published this book
shortly before retiring from the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit.
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true reasoning.2 By elevating form over substance, Posner suspects, advocates and judges apply a veneer of objectivity to half-baked arguments, political preferences, and outcome-oriented decisions.
This first thesis, criticizing legal rigidity, contains a grain of truth. Lawyers and judges can be a stodgy bunch (pp. 4, 50). And that can make the
law less accessible and less sensible. Posner highlights many aspects of our
system—from the courts’ pace to the caselaw’s complexity—that could improve with a less formulaic and more plainspoken approach. When briefs
and opinions elevate form over substance, they can obscure the governing
legal principles and diminish the utility of the judicial process as a whole.
But Posner’s second major thesis, advocating consequentialist interpretation, is a strange response to this problem. Posner complains that formalist
judges are using interpretive tools to achieve outcomes they like.3 His solution? Replace the formalism that he believes is backward-looking with an
aggressive substantive pragmatism that eschews traditional limits of judicial
restraint and democratic accountability.4 But if the problem is masking outcome-driven decisions with legalese, isn’t the solution more transparency,
sounder reasoning, and greater objectivity? Not according to Posner. Instead
of binding policy-driven judges to the rule of law, Posner would liberate
them to do justice as they see fit—at least when they can avoid any textual or
precedential barriers “by hook or by crook.”5
Setting aside problems of popular consent and separation of powers,
Posner’s version of pragmatic case-by-case judging, when considered in the
aggregate, fails even on his own pragmatic terms. Litigants, lawyers, and
judges depend on the stability and ascertainability of the law. Yet without an
advance commitment to basic interpretive principles (those formal legal
texts, precedents, and rules of interpretation this book disparages), who can
anticipate how a judiciary of Posnerian pragmatists would articulate and
apply that law? Everything is up for grabs when judges opt “not to worry
initially about doctrine, precedent, and the other conventional materials of
legal analysis, but instead to try to figure out the sensible solution to the
problem[s]” before them (p. 80).
This view of the judge’s role is fundamentally at odds with our experience litigating and deciding cases in the federal courts. Equally important,
“pragmatic” interpretation unleashes great unpredictability outside the
courtroom: it becomes hard to advise clients, arrange legal relationships, and
plan everyday conduct.
Posner’s substitution of forward-looking pragmatism for backwardlooking (which is to say, ordinary) tools of legal interpretation, therefore,
would only exacerbate the operational shortcomings he critiques. And vice
versa: his operational critiques—though often valid—have little to do with
his substantive critique of legal formalism. From our perspectives in and
2.
3.
4.
5.

See, e.g., pp. 54–55, 80–81.
E.g., pp. 385–86.
See p. 390.
P. 80; see p. 261.
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among the federal judiciary, Judge Posner’s cure would only worsen the
disease.
The Pragmatic Judiciary: Efficient, Transparent, and Intelligible
[T]he sum of the “small matters” discussed . . . is not itself a small matter.
(p. 60)

What did The Bluebook ever do to Richard Posner? His scorn for the
“Uniform System of Citation” is unrelenting. No subject (save Justice Scalia,
and perhaps Justice Kagan’s comments about Justice Scalia)6 comes in for
harsher treatment in this book. Yes, we (and countless judges, lawyers, and
students) agree that the 500-page ukase is “hate[d] . . . with a passion” (pp.
21, 46–48, 61). The Berkeley Journal of Gender, Law & Justice, whose statement explaining its decision to ditch The Bluebook Posner block-quotes, was
amply justified in rejecting the “investment of editorial time and effort
which is wildly disproportionate to the [Bluebook’s] utility” (pp. 46–47).
But what does that have to do with the strengths and weaknesses of the
federal judiciary?
The same question can be asked of many other Posnerian pet peeves.
These command substantial attention in The Federal Judiciary (if not the
actual federal judiciary). Given the book’s ambition, these harangues often
border on the trivial. Why does it matter whether law clerks call their boss
“Judge,” “Your Honor,” “Amul,” or “Hey you”?7 For that matter, why does
Posner care whether the judicial workplace is called “chambers” (derived
from the Old French chambre, he explains) rather than “office” (derived
from the Old French ofice, Google explains)?8
“What does it tell us,” Posner asks, “about our judges, and the legal
profession more broadly,” that “such antiquarian silliness persist[s]?” (p. 7).
One could ask the same question about many other objects of his disapproval: the spittoons behind the Supreme Court bench (p. 216), censored
curse words (pp. 216, 390–92), untelevised judicial hearings (pp. 13–14,
215), and unpublished bench statements (pp. 215–16). What do they tell us
about the strengths and weaknesses of the federal judiciary? Candidly, we
have no idea.
Other trifles, however, may add up to something more. Though the lead
is well buried, “the sum of [at least some of] the ‘small matters’ discussed”
shows how a persistent emphasis on form can diminish the substantive quality of the courts’ output.9 Posner identifies a number of ways in which
6. Posner’s criticism of Justice Kagan’s comments about Justice Scalia is befuddling at
best. See pp. 66–69. It is hard to doubt the significance of Scalia’s contribution to the legal
profession, and it is hardly a surprise that Kagan befriended him. Kagan is a lot like Scalia:
brilliant and very friendly. If we have lost the ability to praise a departed colleague despite past
disagreements, then the federal judiciary is far weaker than even Posner claims.
7. See p. 4.
8. See p. 7.
9. See p. 60.
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courts operate less transparently, less efficiently, and less intelligibly—in a
word, less pragmatically—than they should.
It is true that the federal judiciary is weakened, however indirectly, by
law schools’ general inattention to legal-writing instruction. So too by the
academy’s failure to teach procedure and trial practice in a practical manner.
Inexperienced law clerks asked to draft their bosses’ opinions, Posner observes, may regurgitate their loquacious bench memos inspired by abstract
academic writing (p. 59). Wouldn’t we be better off if all that time spent
Bluebooking was devoted to persuasive writing instead?
Posner is definitely correct that “formulaic” legal writing can lead to
verbose and stilted opinions that may shade, rather than illuminate, governing legal principles.10 Few things are as frustrating as the judicial opinion
that spends pages rehashing each side’s arguments only to conclude, without
elaboration, that “the court is persuaded” by one side or the other. Such
rulings have all the explanatory power of Bartleby the Scrivener—which is to
say, none at all.11 The judge would do better simply to declare which side
won; after all, that would save everyone a lot of time.
We agree that our system suffers when rote argumentation, excessive
string-citation, and legal jargon dictate, rather than explain, judicial decisions. Muddled multifactor tests, convoluted tiers of deference, and illusory
standards of review may prove good fodder for law-review articles; they do
markedly less to serve clients’ interests in the stability, predictability, and
(make no mistake) affordability of the law.12 Posner is right to target this
sort of overly formulaic judging—exemplified by his concerns about deference to the administrative state (p. 30)—because it disserves litigants and
sacrifices the legitimacy courts claim from publicly showing their work.13 We
would have preferred to hear more from him about how these practical ills
affected the output of his court during nearly four decades of judging.
So at least some of Posner’s smaller procedural points do add up to
something more: the legal process should highlight rather than obscure the
core of judicial decisionmaking. The practical operations of the federal court
system Posner envisions are fairly attractive: Law clerks schooled in the actual practice of litigation would support, but never supplant, the reasoning
and writing of federal judges. The bench would announce transparent decisions in an accessible manner, with a better appreciation of the law practical
10. See pp. 59–60.
11. Melville’s Bartleby repeated a simple “explanation” for his refusal to work: “I would
prefer not to.” Butte County v. Hogen, 613 F.3d 190, 195 & n.4 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (quoting
Herman Melville, Bartleby, the Scrivener: A Story of Wall Street 10 (Dover 1990)
(1853)).
12. See p. 30; see also Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. Chi. L.
Rev. 1175, 1179, 1182 (1989).
13. See, e.g., Dep’t of Transp. v. Ass’n of Am. R.Rs., 135 S. Ct. 1225, 1242 (2015)
(Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment); Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass’n, 135 S. Ct. 1199, 1213
(2015) (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment); Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch, 834 F.3d 1142,
1149 (10th Cir. 2016) (Gorsuch, J., concurring); Philip Hamburger, Is Administrative Law
Unlawful? (2014).
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effects outside the courtroom. And, in one of Posner’s most enticing suggestions, appellate judges, even (especially?) at the Supreme Court, would “ride
circuit” in the lower courts. This would require them to apply their tests and
precedents in the mine-run of litigated disputes, rather than in their more
curated appellate dockets.14 This, more than anything, could lead judges to
prefer bright-line rules to complex opinions, fractured decisions, and multifactor tests, which are time-consuming and costly to litigants and lowercourt judges.15 These steps undoubtedly would improve the intelligibility,
predictability, and efficiency—those pragmatic virtues—of the federal
judiciary.
The Self-Defeating Case for Judicial Pragmatism
My approach in judging a case is therefore not to worry initially about doctrine, precedent, and the other conventional materials of legal analysis . . . .
(p. 80)

Far more problematic is how this critique of the courts’ operations sits
alongside Posner’s preferred interpretive method—judicial pragmatism.
Here we definitively part ways with Posner: his substantive prescription simply does not follow from his practical diagnosis. Nothing about how judges
manage chambers, cite precedents, or use law clerks suggests courts
should—as Posner says—interpret legal texts to produce preferred policy
outcomes.
The radical nature of Judge Posner’s vision in this book should not be
underestimated. This is no mere rehash of familiar economic or commonlaw theories. The pragmatism advanced by The Federal Judiciary is something else entirely: advocating outcome-driven statutory interpretation that
is explicitly outcome-driven to achieve “socially beneficial effects” (p. 17);
dismissing legal texts as “putty in the hands” of the very judges whom Posner deems lacking (p. 101); and offering those same “deficient” judges a
mandate to answer all manner of policy questions, even or especially when
no governing legal text supplies an answer (p. 67). Judges should not worry
so much about doctrine, precedent, or text, the book contends, and should
instead work to improve society by determining the most sensible resolution
of a dispute, so long as it’s not unavoidably blocked by an authoritative
precedent (p. 80). Whereas earlier Posner works may have criticized his colleagues for pretextual-textualism or a lack of judicial candor, his latest work
celebrates a consequentialist liberation from time-worn tools of interpretation (p. 80).
14. See pp. 213–14 (quoting Jonathan Turley, Battling over Neil Gorsuch Is Beside the
Point: The Supreme Court Needs an Institutional Overhaul, L.A. Times (Feb. 1, 2017, 3:00 AM),
http://www.latimes.com/opinion/op-ed/la-oe-turley-supreme-court-reform-20170201-story.
html [https://perma.cc/UBE2-ST2S]; Craig S. Lerner & Nelson Lund, Judicial Duty and the
Supreme Court’s Cult of Celebrity, 78 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1255, 1295–99 (2010) (discussing
return of Supreme Court circuit riding).
15. See Scalia, supra note 12, at 1175–81.
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If we take Posner at his word, the traditional tools of interpretation no
longer matter in hard cases. Text, precedent, and doctrine receive attention
only after the pragmatic judge has inferred the correct outcome of a particular dispute. The sole remaining question is whether these legal authorities
stand squarely in the way of that preferred result. Probably they would not,
Posner suggests, because a competent judge can get around most would-be
legal constraints “by hook or by crook” (p. 80).
Once they bypass legal constraints, what are pragmatists left with other
than their own views for an optimal world? What would a judge consult to
determine the optimal outcome? Economics? Sociology? How about physics
or moral philosophy? And how would lawyers or lay people know what principles a judge would apply in their case? One could read a statute until blue
in the face without understanding how the federal judiciary would apply it.
Moreover, the law would be in a constant state of flux. Pragmatists including
Posner candidly admit that “current values” may shift a statute’s meaning in
either direction based on the judge’s impression of society’s needs at the
time.16
There is much about this approach to trouble those concerned with the
institutional legitimacy of the courts in a republic, and those critiques are
well-rehearsed elsewhere.17 The main upshot of the interpretive approach
advanced in The Federal Judiciary, however, is how poorly it fares on Posner’s own pragmatic terms.
If anything, Posner’s first thesis—his indictment of the aptitudes of the
federal bench—cuts against the vast authority pragmatism would grant to
judges to decide cases based on factors far beyond the ordinary tools of legal
interpretation. Posner never confronts why the judges he criticizes as sorely
lacking in technical and scientific training18 should nevertheless be empowered to displace or update the policy judgments of Congress. If today’s judicial-selection process is as broken as Posner complains (p. 37), why would
we expect it to produce lawyer-physicists and lawyer-ethicists superior to the
current crop? And even assuming the right set of philosopher kings, there is
no reason to expect that a critical mass of courts would settle on a consistent

16. Posner is by no means alone. The modern legal-realist tradition from which pragmatism flows claims an impressive pedigree tracing to Karl Llewellyn and beyond. Dean John
Manning has labeled Professors Bill Eskridge and Philip Frickey as the “leading modern
pragmatists.” John F. Manning, Inside Congress’s Mind, 115 Colum. L. Rev. 1911, 1920 (2015).
They advocate that “judges in statutory cases should engage in ‘practical reasoning’—a form
of pragmatic, dynamic, multifactor analysis that does not depend upon unearthing some decision actually made by the legislature” with respect to statutory interpretation. Id.; see, e.g.,
William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Statutory Interpretation as Practical Reasoning, 42
Stan. L. Rev. 321 (1990).
17. See, e.g., Antonin Scalia, A Matter of Interpretation: Federal Courts and
the Law (1997); Frank H. Easterbrook, Statutes’ Domains, 50 U. Chi. L. Rev. 533 (1983).
18. See p. 67.
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way to deploy the common-lawmaking tools Posner would hand them.19
Much less reason to suspect they would reach similar results in so doing.
Academic studies supply substantial reason to doubt judges’ predictive abilities, even on questions much closer to their core judicial competencies.20
More fundamentally, liberating judges to decide cases based on perceived consequences could only make the federal-court system and the
corpus of federal law less pragmatic when considered in the aggregate. This
book only rarely distinguishes the immediate consequence of resolving a
given dispute from the more systemic consequence of arrogating commonlawmaking authority to life-tenured federal judges.21 No attention is afforded the effect of pragmatic interpretation on lower-court judges seeking
to faithfully apply binding precedent.
We know Posner believes horizontal stare decisis is practically meaningless when it comes to prior panels of his court (p. 88). Despite the court of
appeals’ standard and followed practice of adhering to the “law of the circuit,” pragmatists of his stripe appear willing to consider the world anew
every day. What does this say to his colleagues? Or to the trial judges, lawyers, and citizens who rely upon those circuit court decisions?22
And what of vertical stare decisis? Presumably Posner is unwilling to
subvert Supreme Court decisions on point; unless its precedents were binding, why would he care so much about their purported lack of quality?23 But
may federal district judges in Chicago, Milwaukee, and Evansville revisit—in
light of changed circumstances and updated knowledge—Posner’s 3,300
written decisions on questions of contract, antitrust, patent, and criminal
law? The destabilizing effects of pragmatism are profound, and they extend
19. Pragmatism, Judge Wilkinson explains, “puts great power in judges’ hands and tells
them precious little about what to do with it.” J. Harvie Wilkinson III, Cosmic Constitutional Theory: Why Americans Are Losing Their Inalienable Rights to Self-Governance 87–88 (2012).
20. See F.A. Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society, 35 Am. Econ. Rev. 519, 519–20
(1945); Michael J. Klarman, Brown at 50, 90 Va. L. Rev. 1613, 1619–21 (2004).
21. See generally Adrian Vermeule, Judging Under Uncertainty: An Institutional
Theory of Legal Interpretation (2006). Previous Posner writings gave more weight to
these second-order considerations of the law’s stability beyond the case at hand. See, e.g.,
Richard A. Posner, Judges’ Writing Styles (and Do They Matter?), 62 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1421,
1432–33 (1995) (granting “due regard for such systemic constraints on the freewheeling employment of ‘reason’ as the need to maintain continuity with previous decisions”). By the time
Posner published How Judges Think in 2008, however, Dean Levi could fault Posner for
“pay[ing] so little attention to the average case or to the processes of fair adjudication, including the roles of the advocate and of our procedural rules and practices.” David F. Levi, Autocrat of the Armchair, 58 Duke L.J. 1791, 1793 (2009) (reviewing Richard A. Posner, How
Judges Think (2008)).
22. Although Supreme Court justices have different considerations when it comes to
stare decisis, an appellate judge sitting on a single panel within one of twelve regional circuits
cannot circumvent precedent without introducing tremendous uncertainty into the law.
23. See Scheiber v. Dolby Labs., Inc., 293 F.3d 1014, 1017–18 (7th Cir. 2002) (Posner, J.)
(“[W]e have no authority to overrule a Supreme Court decision no matter how dubious its
reasoning strikes us, or even how out of touch with the Supreme Court’s current thinking the
decision seems.”).
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well beyond the courthouse. How would the shrewdest counselor or
dealmaker even begin to anticipate the consequentialist caselaw that the next
generation of junior Judge Posners might produce? Lawyers and clients crave
predictability, which counsels a degree of caution far beyond that Posner
seems willing to accept.
Even when a precedent is not on point, consequentialist reasoning
threatens the transparency and intelligibility of the law. These pragmatic
considerations, which reach beyond the four corners of a particular dispute,
ought to counsel judges to limit the information considered and rules announced in adjudication.24 More insidiously, an anything-goes approach to
judging destabilizes the courts’ authority and the rule of law by raising the
baseline level of uncertainty. Does the law bind judges, or do judges use
“law” as merely a label to bind the rest of us?
Ceding policymaking authority to federal judges25 may seem attractive
to some in the current constitutional moment. But a serious objection to
Posner’s thesis—looming but largely unaddressed in the book—is how interpretive pragmatism usurps the role of the “other” political branches (for
Posner treats the courts as a third policymaking arm of government). Posner
fails to stop and ask why the other branches would even listen to the judiciary once judges enter their domain. The legislature and the executive possess
a far superior mandate and competence for identifying the “common sense”
and “contemporary” policies Posner seeks. Yet Posner accepts that judges,
too, may sometimes drift into political debates because “in national emergencies . . . law bends to necessity” (p. 187). But if judges are licensed to
bend the law whenever they perceive the exigencies require it, then how can
the law possibly hold firm and constrain executive officials and legislators
who perceive their own exigencies?26
Why wouldn’t Donald Trump or Barack Obama be as entitled as Richard Posner to assess legal texts according to their own common sense or
moral intuition? If the social utility of competing constitutional or statutory
interpretations is a question in adjudication, it is hard indeed to exclude the
political branches from the debate by privileging the courts’ interpretive
flexibility.
The consequences of consequentialism go further still—and right to the
core of the rule of law and its place in our civil society. The respect and
deference given judicial decisions in this country is neither automatic nor
permanent. Posner’s own statistics regarding the diminishing public standing of the courts prove this very point (pp. 124–25). If the federal judiciary
24. Vermeule, supra note 21, at 5.
25. In happier times, Posner described his fellow appellate judges as councils of “wise
elders.” See Richard A. Posner, Reply: The Institutional Dimension of Statutory and Constitutional Interpretation, 101 Mich. L. Rev. 952, 959 (2003). Though he appears no longer to hold
them in the same esteem, he would nevertheless afford them remarkably broad authority.
26. Remarkably, Posner embraces the Supreme Court’s most infamous decisions—Plessy
and Korematsu—as pragmatically correct. P. 51. This shows just how badly pragmatism has
served us in the past, and why constraints stouter than prevailing views of what is “ ‘right’ for
its time” are necessary to protect constitutional rights from erosion. P. 51.
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embraced atextual pragmatism, the American people would realize it and
resent their loss of self-governance—as many perhaps already do.27
This is not a concern limited to those who subscribe to the old chestnuts
of the “majesty of the law” and “guardians of liberty”—notions that no
doubt turn Judge Posner’s stomach. It is both easy and chilling to consider
the damage done if not only 5–4 Supreme Court decisions, but also everyday criminal convictions and civil suits, were viewed as the mere “political”
preferences of a “politician in robes,” rather than the dispassionate application of a duly enacted law. The backward-looking nature of the bench that
Posner decries (p. 50) is in fact bound up with the most fundamental elements of the rule of law: notice, precedent, fact-finding, and the role of the
jury, to name but a few.28 Expanding the social remedies available in adjudication, moreover, teaches partisans of all stripes to demand vindication in
court rather than compromise on policy in the political process.29
The Pragmatism of Interpretation
Whether ideological, heartfelt, or feigned, formalism is a compounding
sin . . . . (p. 28)

So far we have discussed two versions of Posner’s pragmatism. His “operational” pragmatism, while sometimes trivial, helpfully encourages judges
and lawyers to strip away the formalistic trappings of their work to reveal
and sharpen their legal reasoning. But his “substantive” pragmatism unhelpfully encourages judges to strip away the disciplining formalism of textual and precedential interpretation to decide cases based on preferred
outcomes. In either instance, Posner aims to make the federal judiciary more
intelligible, efficient, and uniform—in short, more pragmatic. These are important aims. But when it comes to how we read and apply federal law, the
“formal” approach to text and precedent turns out to make the federal judiciary far more pragmatic in the long run.
The tools Posner maligns as backward and ritualistic—the operative
text, historical context, and precedential reasoning—are those that best serve
the bench and bar’s interest in a stable body of discernible federal caselaw.
When that body of law is considered on the whole, particularly from the
perspective of the district judges and lawyers who apply it on a daily basis,
our shared goals of intelligibility, efficiency, and uniformity require more,
27. The loss of Americans’ “inalienable right to self-governance” animates Judge Wilkinson’s critique of Posner and competing theorists in Cosmic Constitutional Theory. Wilkinson, supra note 19, at 9.
28. See generally Michael H. McGinley, Note, Textualism as Fair Notice, 123 Harv. L.
Rev. 542 (2009).
29. Though the pragmatic judge may have a solution for most every contingency, the
Constitution—whose flaws pragmatists readily acknowledge—certainly does not. See Henry P.
Monaghan, Our Perfect Constitution, 56 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 353 (1981). Treating the Constitution
as a legal Swiss Army knife relieves the healthy pressure on the people to address those constitutional lacunas through legislative compromise. It also dilutes the force of the cardinal rights
and principles the Framers did choose to enshrine above mere statutes.
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not less, emphasis on the constraining principles of traditional interpretation. For the truly pragmatic judge is one whose rulings flow naturally from
the governing legal text, the precedents reasonably interpreting that text, and
the record of the case in a way that is predictable beforehand and ascertainable thereafter. Requiring lower courts and regulated parties to guess at the
meaning of a statute or precedent is hardly efficient or just. Indeed, the most
pragmatic aspect of the traditional tools of interpretation is that they limit
the number of types of claims that lawyers can plausibly advance in court.
Before the pragmatic judge, however, there is almost always an argument to
be made—and therefore a good reason for a lawyer to roll the dice.
Is focusing on text and precedent, to the exclusion of policy considerations, formalistic? Perhaps—though we might prefer the term “modest.”30 Is
it hard work? Quite often.31 Choosing an equitable outcome or a sound policy can be far easier for a given judge in a given case. Certainly it may be far
more satisfying. Who wouldn’t enjoy playing king for a day?32
Even if our constitutional design didn’t demand that judges apply the
law as written,33 doing so would represent the most pragmatic approach for
someone with a lifetime commission to serve the United States under its
Constitution and laws.34 From our perspectives on the law as practiced in
and around the federal courts, the ordinary tools of interpretation make for
a more intelligible, accessible, and efficient judiciary.
30. What Professor Schauer noted decades ago about the connotation of “formalism”
remains true today: “Even a cursory look at the literature reveals scant agreement on what it is
for decisions in law, or perspectives on law, to be formalistic, except that whatever formalism
is, it is not good.” Frederick Schauer, Formalism, 97 Yale L.J. 509, 509–10 (1988). Yet his
conception of the essence of formalism also holds fast: “At the heart of the word ‘formalism,’
in many of its numerous uses, lies the concept of decisionmaking according to rule.” Id. at 510;
see Scalia, supra note 17, at 25 (“Of all the criticisms leveled against textualism, the most
mindless is that it is ‘formalistic.’ The answer to that is, of course it’s formalistic! The rule of law
is about form . . . . Long live formalism. It is what makes a government a government of laws
and not of men.”).
31. Textualism, Judge Easterbrook explains, is the “tool of the judicial branch” not because the “feats of scholarship and cerebration” it demands are easy, but because those efforts
enforce the social contract between the governed and their governors in a way that protects the
“exceptionally valuable” “stability in [the] political system.” Frank H. Easterbrook, Pragmatism’s Role in Interpretation, 31 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 901, 902–905 (2008); see also Antonin
Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 Cin. L. Rev. 849, 856 (1989) (“[I]t is often exceedingly
difficult to plumb the original understanding of an ancient text.”); Jeffrey S. Sutton, A Review
of Richard A. Posner, How Judges Think (2008), 108 Mich. L. Rev. 859, 864 (2010) (“That there
are close cases, however, does not consign judging to politics. Hard cases do not make political
law; they make difficult-to-decide law.”).
32. Cf. Scalia, supra note 12, at 1176 (“[I]n absolute governments the king is the law.”)
(quoting Thomas Paine, Common Sense, in Common Sense and Other Political Writings 3, 32 (Nelson F. Adkins ed., 1953)).
33. See, e.g., John F. Manning, Statutory Pragmatism and Constitutional Structure, 120
Harv. L. Rev. 1161, 1172 (2007) (“[E]ven for an everyday pragmatist like Judge Posner, the
judge’s proper role draws content from entrenched presuppositions about the allocation of
power in our system of government.”).
34. See 28 U.S.C. § 453 (2012) (providing the “[o]aths of justices and judges”).
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Intelligibility
Nothing is more essential to the rule of law than knowing what the law
says. This is true for the people governed by that law, the lawyers who advise
and advocate for those people, and the judges who apply that law in the
ordinary course. And it is especially true for the people, lawyers, and judges
whose attention is not principally on the finer and contested points of law,
but on the wide variety of legal questions that come across their lives, law
offices, and judicial chambers every day.
Thankfully, not every, or even most, legal proposition is seriously contestable; the vast majority are never litigated.35 The small subset of truly
difficult questions command a disproportionate amount of the time and
candlepower of judges, tall-building lawyers, and law professors. Most
judges and lawyers, however, don’t have the luxury of scouring the F.3d for
circuit splits and clever policy arguments; they are too busy sentencing defendants, developing evidence, and advising clients. They are the ones bearing the brunt of open-ended interpretive pragmatism.
But The Federal Judiciary denigrates “the legal profession’s current
fawning regard for formalism parading under such names as ‘textualism’
and ‘originalism’ ” (p. 28). These are backward-looking heuristics promising
false precision in the law, Posner claims, which “means one thing to conservatives, another to liberals,” and “has no fixity.”36 Likewise, Posner rejects
any obligation to consistency with “what other [judicial or legislative] officials have done in the past.”37
This view vastly discounts the value of orthodox legal interpretation, in
which lawyers and judges engage in a shared enterprise of discerning the
familiar guidelines of text, context, and precedent. For that matter, it rejects
the two interpretive tools equally accessible and intelligible to judges, lawyers, and clients of all sorts: the statutory and constitutional text set forth in
the official laws of the United States, and the binding precedents published
in the official reports of the courts of the United States. In a very real and
even mundane sense, these represent the “fixed” law that binds the bench
and bar. This is our common starting point. Because we all begin at the
same place, moreover, people across a vast country can coordinate and organize their lives around shared and certain principles.38 By reducing these
35. Neil M. Gorsuch, Of Lions and Bears, Judges and Legislators, and the Legacy of Justice
Scalia, 66 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 905, 916–17 (2016).
36. Joel Cohen, Richard A. Posner & Jed S. Rakoff, Should Judges Use Their Roles to Effect
Social Change?, Slate (Aug. 24, 2017, 9:00 AM), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_
politics/jurisprudence/2017/08/posner_rakoff_dialogue_on_how_judges_should_effect_social
_changes.html [https://perma.cc/67GD-8GXQ] (“I don’t know what ‘existing law’ means except views currently held by many judges, lawyers, and politicians,” which “are likely to be
fluid, changeable—in accordance with new social needs, attitudes, and authority”). But see
William Baude, Originalism as a Constraint on Judges, 84 U. Chi. L. Rev. 2213 (2017).
37. Richard A. Posner, Pragmatic Adjudication, 18 Cardozo L. Rev. 1, 4 (1996).
38. The “traditional tools of legal analysis do a remarkable job of eliminating or reducing
indeterminacy” in the law because “when judges pull from the same toolbox and look to the
same materials to answer the same narrow question . . . we confine the range of possible
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binding rules to advisory guidelines, Posner’s pragmatism forfeits our most
valuable tool for ensuring uniform, intelligible law: the legal text itself.
The law can be complex enough without the uncertainty of wondering
what judges will think or do, and which judges will decide your case. The
book’s discussion of “crimes of moral turpitude” (pp. 236–37) shows how
significantly judges sometimes disagree even under the normal constraints
of the traditional interpretive process—not to mention the pragmatist’s license. How could judges ever hold defendants responsible for complying
with these legal obligations unless those obligations also bind the judges
themselves?
This is why the formal tools of judicial interpretation are such an essential public good.39 If lawmakers and judges can come closer to an agreedupon method of discerning the meaning of legal text, statutes should become more precise and adjudications more predictable.40 Under the disciplining effects of traditional interpretation, moreover, the law becomes more
accessible and affordable to people across the country. For most laws and
regulations, there should be no need to access the right sorts of “insider”
lawyers (former clerks, executive officials, or Hill staffers) who can themselves access legal arcana and influencers inaccessible to most.41
In this respect, textualism is a particularly egalitarian and democratic
approach to the law. When the interpretive task is limited to the statute as
written and publicly understood, and as interpreted by courts in subsequent
published decisions, this constrains the sources the judge and lawyer (and
regulator and regulated) must consult to interpret it. The text is accessible in
a way that inside information—particularly about legislative history and
judges’ predilections—is not. Lest we overstate our case, it is worth reiterating that many questions of interpretation are hard, and may require deep
dives into history and usage.42 But measured against the uncabined arguments available before a pragmatist judge, a restrained approach to interpretation increases the transparency and accessibility of legal decisionmaking.
outcomes and provide a remarkably stable and predictable set of rules people are able to
follow.” Gorsuch, supra note 35, at 917.
39. And why Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts, Justice Scalia and Bryan
Garner’s monumental effort to catalogue these tools for more straightforward and accepted
application, is such an important project. See Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading
Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts (2012). Judge Posner famously detested this book
and the constraints its approach would place on judges like him. See Richard A. Posner, The
Incoherence of Antonin Scalia, New Republic (Aug. 23, 2012), https://newrepublic.com/article/
106441/scalia-garner-reading-the-law-textual-originalism [https://perma.cc/ZLK9-9KBJ].
40. But see Lisa Schultz Bressman & Abbe R. Gluck, Statutory Interpretation from the
Inside—An Empirical Study of Congressional Drafting, Delegation, and the Canons: Part II, 66
Stan. L. Rev. 725, 726 (2014) (challenging “textualism’s operating assumption that text is
always the best evidence of the legislative bargain”).
41. See Manning, supra note 16.
42. This is not to say the views of the man on the street are equivalent to those of the
legal scholar. If textual analysis were easy, judges and scholars wouldn’t be busy, for instance,
building historical usage databases to aid the enterprise. See, e.g., James C. Phillips, Daniel M.
Ortner & Thomas R. Lee, Corpus Linguistics & Original Public Meaning: A New Tool to Make
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Efficiency
The uncertainty regarding future judicial decisions that Posner invites
reduces the efficiency of the federal judiciary at every level. Though its selfprofessed mandate is to pursue uniformity of federal law,43 the Supreme
Court’s own lack of uniformity on the basic question of how to read legal
texts causes a cascade of costs and errors. The lack of agreement among nine
justices implicitly licenses more than 200 courts of appeals judges to employ
an even greater variety of approaches, with the slim prospect of certiorari
review representing only a weak tempering force. If these appellate judges
are liberated, as Posner proposes, to do justice according to their conception
of the public good, then heaven help our 800-plus district judges attempting
to follow judge-made decisional law. Not to mention the hundreds of
thousands of litigators and counselors who will be hard pressed to confidently predict the contours of federal law.
This level of uncertainty is not just costly, but incompatible with the
rule of law.44 Even if some pragmatists and purposivists in the academy lag
behind, the bench appears to be slowly but surely moving down the path
marked by Justice Scalia: According to no less an authority than Justice Kagan—President Obama’s first solicitor general and second Supreme Court
pick—“we’re all textualists now.”45 “Does anyone,” Justice Kagan asks, “now
decline to focus first, in reading a statute, on its text in context?”46 Certainly
not in the briefs submitted to the Supreme Court these days. This represents
an interpretive sea change during the tenure of Justice Scalia. And it’s a big
reason why the Supreme Court and courts of appeals start on the same page
today in approaching statutory questions. By narrowing the bounds of potential disagreement and confusion among judges, a focus on the written
statutory language offers the least-bad alternative for serving the law’s fundamental interests in fair notice.47 And it enables judges to render their decisions with relative speed (and fewer concurrences and dissents) thus
achieving the efficiency that idiosyncratic pragmatism fails to deliver.
Originalism More Empirical, 126 Yale L.J.F. 21, 24, 27–28 (2016), https://www.yalelawjour
nal.org/pdf/10.Phillips.MACROEDFINAL_izrkk2s8.pdf [https://perma.cc/YZM6-6QTD].
43. See, e.g., Sup. Ct. R. 10.
44. Scalia, supra note 12, at 1179.
45. See Justice Elena Kagan, The Scalia Lecture at Harvard Law School (Nov. 25, 2015),
https://today.law.harvard.edu/in-scalia-lecture-kagan-discusses-statutory-interpretation/
[https://perma.cc/G6GF-Q2MM]. Justice Kagan elaborated on Justice Scalia’s legacy by asking
whether “anyone now decline[s] to focus first, in reading a statute, on its text in context? Does
anyone now ignore the Founders’ commitments when addressing constitutional meaning —
or just as important, dispute the need for a viable theory of constitutional interpretation, even
if not Justice Scalia’s brand of originalism, to constrain judges from acting on their personal
policy preferences? If the answer is no (and the answer is no), Justice Scalia deserves much of
the credit.” Elena Kagan, In Memoriam: Justice Antonin Scalia, 130 Harv. L. Rev. 5, 9 (2016)
[hereinafter Kagan, In Memoriam].
46. Kagan, In Memoriam, supra note 45, at 9.
47. McGinley, supra note 28, at 560.
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Consider how often a Richard Posner and an Antonin Scalia—despite
their shared pedigrees as Harvard-trained, Reagan-appointed, law-professorturned-judges—would disagree on questions of social, economic, criminal,
and foreign policy. Their track records suggest quite a lot. If both set out to
apply the traditional tools of legal interpretation, however, they would be far
less likely to disagree on how to read a Supreme Court or Seventh Circuit
precedent, and less still on how to apply the specific words of the U.S. Code
as understood at the time of their enactment. Focusing on the law as written
narrows disagreement in the appellate courts, and commensurately limits
uncertainty in the trial courts and law offices. Interestingly, the statistics
support this view. Judges of very different backgrounds and philosophical
views often reach similar results.48 Why? Because they accept that they are
bound by the law.
The efficiency of interpretive “formalism” also benefits from a feedback
loop. When the rules of the game are (more) settled in advance, independent of the particular policy at hand, this facilitates a healthy conversation
between courts and Congress. As more judges emphasize the primacy of text
over legislative history or unenacted policy considerations, legislative drafters have a greater incentive to specify congressional aims in the statute itself
rather than committee reports or insider dialogue. This, of course, only
makes it more profitable for future courts to cabin their review to the four
corners of the statute. All this stands in contrast to the fracturing effects of
pragmatism, with each branch interpreting the law as it sees fit.
Uniformity
The governing text and precedent are the common threads constraining
federal judges across the United States to treat like cases alike—no matter
judges’ divergent conceptions of the common good. It should be unsurprising that a high degree of structure is necessary to bind a vast nation and
unify a far-flung bench with a coherent and consistent body of law. Posner’s
allusions to modern management theory ignore the mundane attention to
detail required by today’s supply chains or design teams.49 Perfect equality of
treatment is, sadly, “difficult to demonstrate and . . . impossible to
achieve.”50 But principled, rule-based decisionmaking, based on factors set
forth in advance and independent of a particular judge or litigant, is our
best tool for fostering uniformity of the law and equal treatment of litigants
over the great mass of cases—if not perfection in each individual case.51 The
text and precedent are what binds judges, and what binds together our legal
system.
48. Judges Posner and Easterbrook, for example, agreed nearly 99% of the time between
1985 and 1999. Sutton, supra note 31, at 866 (citing Daniel A. Farber, Do Theories of Statutory
Interpretation Matter? A Case Study, 94 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1409, 1432 (2000)).
49. See pp. 8–15.
50. Scalia, supra note 12, at 1182.
51. Id. at 1178.
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These tools are also the stabilizing forces that refresh the courts’ legitimacy within a democratic republic—as well as the people’s capacity for selfgovernment. When the people gave the government the authority to control
their day-to-day activities, the people retained ultimate control over who
formed the government. When judges disrespect that bargain by applying
their own policy preferences rather than the law as written, they drain the
ability of the people, through their elected representatives, to resolve social
problems.52 Filing a lawsuit is far easier—though far less stable and representative—than enacting legislation or amending the Constitution.
Clearly, a theme of The Federal Judiciary is Posner’s frustration that our
government doesn’t update the law fast enough in today’s complex and rapidly changing world. To him, and to many others, bicameralism and presentment must seem outmoded.53 But, in a democracy, giving absolute updating
power to judges is not the answer and is not allowed. “[I]n a government
where life-appointed judges are free to legislate alongside elected representatives,” the “very idea of self-government would seem to wither to the point
of pointlessness.”54
Conclusion
What is a judge in neutral? (p. 115)

The Federal Judiciary, if nothing else, forces every reader to confront the
human element of judging in a democracy. Even the most earnest adherence
to neutral principles and governing text, we readily concede, will lead to
error and disagreement within the courts. Any approach, including the most
objective textualism, will fall short of the constitutional goal. For judges are
only human.
The proper reaction to this gap between the practical and the ideal
marks our most fundamental departure from Posner’s approach. Missing
from his prescription is the tradition of humility, even self-doubt, that can
be found in the work of the great common-law judges like Hand and
Holmes he professes to venerate. Also absent is concern for the errors judges
themselves may introduce to the law. Despite his low regard for his fellow
judges, he prescribes a thoroughly judge-driven mode of interpretation.55
Posner sees the all-too-human composition of the federal bench and
surrenders: because they’ll never fully escape their personal priors, let’s drop
the pretense and embrace our personal views, heretofore suppressed (ineffectively) beneath a veneer of legal formalism. At least, Posner contends, we
might get some better policy out of this transparently consequentialist
approach.
52. Easterbrook, supra note 31, at 904–05.
53. E.g., pp. 414–15.
54. Gorsuch, supra note 35, at 913.
55. Vermeule, supra note 21, at 56.
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We, on the other hand, see the human nature of the federal courts as a
reason to strive ever harder for the constitutional ideal of impartial interpretation. A truly “realist” approach to the law, it seems to us, recognizes that
human institutions can perform better or worse depending on the tools
and—dare we say—incentives applied to Judge Posner and his former colleagues on the bench. That judges will fall short, even in an ideal system, is
an argument for trying harder to approach the mark, not for abandoning
the goal entirely. “Formalism,” notwithstanding Posner’s protests and its
undoubted imperfections, constrains judicial decisionmaking.56 The whole
point is to minimize the role of the particular judge and maximize the rule
of law.
Because judges are human, formalism is in a sense aspirational. As Justice Scalia admitted, “the main danger in judicial interpretation of the Constitution—or, for that matter, in judicial interpretation of any law—is that
the judges will mistake their own predilections for the law. Avoiding this
error is the hardest part of being a conscientious judge; perhaps no conscientious judge ever succeeds entirely.”57
But this is no basis for rejecting a formal approach to interpreting legal
texts; it only heightens the need to incorporate limits, rather than license,
into the judicial system. That textualism will sometimes fail to constrain
judges is no reason to surrender to other interpretive approaches that, by
their very design, impose fewer and less effective constraints.

56. One need only consider the list of counterintuitive “policy” outcomes Justice Scalia
and his colleagues reached—on the First Amendment and criminal procedure, to name the
two most prominent subjects—to see these constraints in action. Very few people would question Justice Scalia’s distaste for, say, flag burning or violent video games. See Texas v. Johnson,
491 U.S. 397 (1989) (flag burning); Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786 (2011)
(violent video games). Yet he and his colleagues protected them because they understood the
First Amendment to compel it.
57. Scalia, supra note 31, at 863.

